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The Evolution of Law: The Roman System 
of Contracts 
Alan Watson 
I have two aims in producing this paper. First, I wish to contribute to the 
general understanding of how and why law develops and explain the 
evolution of some very familiar legal institutions. Second, I wish to add to 
our knowledge of the history of Roman law, by producing a radically 
different view of the development of contracts, that is, I believe, both 
consistent with surviving textual data and plausible with regard to human 
behavior. 
Roman law has been the most innovative and most copied system in the 
West; the law of contract was the most original and the most admired part 
of that system. Private agreements and applicable law occupy a central role 
in mercantile countries-indeed, in the Western world in general, and one 
would expect on a priori grounds that this branch of law would illuminate 
the whole subject of legal development and law in society. This is especially 
true in that a contract is a private agreement, almost a private law, operating 
between two individuals but requiring state recognition. The state may be 
either slow or quick to give such recognition: slow as in England where by 
the late twelfth century, the central royal courts exercised much jurisdiction 
over property law and criminal law but little over contract;' quick as in 
Rome where before 451 B.C. stipulatio could be used to make a legally 
enforceable agreement. The state may also have reservations about 
recognizing private agreements. It may be willing to enforce only agreements 
with specified minimum value-only those considered to have sufficient 
social or economic interest to the state. Or it may restrict its recognition to 
agreements concluded with specified formalities, the formalities might 
constitute an evidentiary justification or impress on the parties the 
seriousness of what they were doing. Or it may restrict its recognition to 
agreements of a particular subject matter. For instance, in Rome, the law 
enforced an agreement to exchange goods for money but not an agreement 
to exchange goods for services. 
Alan Watson is Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
This paper is for David Daube, on his 75th birthday. I am grateful to my friends, John L. 
Barton, Stephen B. Burbank, Charles Donahue, Jr. and Michael H. Hoeflich, who read a 
draft of this paper and gave valuable criticisms. A version of this paper was also delivered 
before the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program of the University of California at 
Berkeley and before the Classics Department of Stanford University in November 1983, and 
I received many useful comments. As always, my greatest debt, directly and indirectly, is to 
my master, David Daube. 
1. See Glanvil, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly 
Called Glanvill, ed. G.D.C. Hall, Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie 
(London, 1955) X. 18; see, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of 
Contract (Oxford, 1975) 4. 
Law and History Review 
State recognition may involve various combinations of restrictions. For 
example, the French Code civil, art. 1341, provides that any agreement 
above a very tiny sum, although it is valid as a contract, is not susceptible of 
proof in court unless there is a written document either accepted by a notary 
or signed by the parties;2 and the German Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, ?518 
requires that in order for a gift agreement to be enforceable it be recorded 
judicially or notarially. 
The immediate aim of the present paper is to account for the recognition 
by the Roman state of the individual types of contract, such as deposit and 
sale; to show why they arose individually in the chronological order that 
they did; to indicate why the dividing lines between one contract and 
another are as they are; and to explain why other contracts, such as a 
general contract in writing did not arise or, as in the case of barter, arose 
only late and with unsatisfactory rules. It will become apparent that, 
although economic or social reasons demanded the introduction of each 
type, it was the legal tradition that determined the nature, structure and 
chronology of every contract. The basic structure of Roman contract law 
developed without reference to and then lived in spite of any societal 
justification for the divisions. 
The starting point in time of this inquiry is the era shortly before the 
enactment of the Twelve Tables, the earliest Roman codification, which is 
traditionally and, I think, accurately attributed to around 451-50 B.C.3 And 
I will tentatively and possibly rather crudely define 'contract' for present 
purposes as an agreement between two or more persons whose main legal 
consequence is an obligation with an effect personal rather than real. There 
is, of course, in any investigation of a legal system from a very different time 
and place always an initial difficulty of categorization. The question is 
specifically whether the Romans of that time conceived the notion of 
contract as we do. The answer is probably no, that in fact the Romans had 
no abstract concept of 'contract.' That term as used here includes, in the 
early fifth century B.C. the contract of stipulatio, but it excludes con- 
veyances like mancipatio and in jure cessio and security transactions like 
nexum, even though the latter also possess elements of obligation based on 
agreement. This separation may seem unfortunate. But there are three 
reasons to accept the limitation on the term contract. First, our knowledge 
of the Twelve Tables is limited, and we have no evidence that the early 
Romans would have classified stipulatio with mancipatio and the others. 
Secondly, this categorization allows us to include all of the obligations that 
later Romans regarded as contractual and to exclude all obligations that 
later Romans did not regard as contracts. Thirdly, the modern perspective 
has grown out of the ideas that the Romans developed.4 
2. But there are exceptions. 
3. For the argument see, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (Edinburgh, 1974) 15. 
4. Mancipatio was a formal ceremony needed to transfer certain important kinds of 
property, and its obligational content was an inherent warranty against the eviction of 
the transferee from the property. Nexum is obscure, is probably a variant form of 
mancipatio, and it involved a creditor having real rights over the person of the nexus: see, 
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It is often said that the Romans never developed a system of contract but 
only of individual contracts,5 and the attempt is sometimes made to explain 
in economic terms why each contract arose when it did. Such attempts are 
doomed to failure because no investigation into contracts one by one and 
separately can make sense in economic terms of the order of their appear- 
ance. For instance, the contract of deposit appears in the fifth century 
B.C., loan for consumption in the third century B.C. at the latest, but barter, 
insofar as it was ever a contract at all, had to wait at least another few 
hundred years; all this occurred while there was no contract of sale until 
about 200 B.C. Again, there was no specific contract for reward for looking 
after a thing, reward in return for another's use of one's thing, or reward for 
one's services until, after the advent of coined money, the introduction of the 
contract of hire sometime close to 200 B.C. In these circumstances, the early 
dating, before 123 B.C.,6 of the invention of a contract of mandate where 
someone agreed to act gratuitously for another-and the essence of the 
contract specified that the performance be gratuitous-seems unlikely if the 
need for the contract is to be explained on economic grounds. 
The truth is more complicated, but if one is prepared to grant an 
important role for legal development to the legal tradition, then the 
unfolding of the growth of Roman contracts is rational and simple to 
explain. From very early times the Romans had a method, the stipulatio, by 
which parties could agree to create any obligation as long as it was not 
positively unlawful. If one dares to speak probably anachronistically, one 
can say that in very early times the Romans did have a general theory of 
contract, not a law of individual contracts. The question to be resolved then 
is how did this general approach to contract come to be lost? The clue to the 
development lies in a very strange fact that needs an explanation: apart from 
the very special and complex case of partnership, all Roman contracts either 
have a money prestation or no prestation. In this latter category are two 
kinds of contract: they may either be gratuitous of necessity or they are 
unilateral (in which case they may be matched with another contract). What 
does not exist, apart from the late and uncertain instance of barter, is a 
Roman contract where goods or, in a different case, services are proffered in 
return for goods and services. What is striking, moreover, is that in deciding 
which contract is involved, the touchstone is whether performance is 
necessarily (so far as the contract goes) for nothing or whether the 
performance is for money. For instance, depositum, commodatum (loan for 
use) and mandatum all become hire (locatio conductio) if payment is 
e.g., Max Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht I, 2d ed. (Munich, 1971) 165ff.; Alan 
Watson, Rome of the XII Tables (Princeton, 1975) 11 ff., 134 ff.; Gyorgy Di6sdi, 
Contract in Roman Law (Budapest, 1981) 30 ff. It is Di6sdi who would add in iure 
cessio as involving an obligation. It was a fictional law suit to effect the transfer of 
ownership in which the defendant, the owner, put up no defense to a claim of ownership 
from the plaintiff, the transferee. None of these three institutions had a major impact on 
the later development of the law of contract. 
5. See, e.g., J.A.C. Thomas, A Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam, 1976) 226. 
6. Rhetorica ad Herennium, 2.13.19. 
3 
Law and History Review 
promised. What is so significant about a prestation in coined money that a 
Roman contractual type must either contain it or be gratuitous? The 
solution to the problem of development, I submit, is that in most cases an 
individual type of Roman contract arose subsequently to stipulatio when, 
for whatever reason, a stipulatio was inappropriate or inefficient for that 
type of situation and when there was a societal need. Thus, almost every 
subsequent contractual type is a derogation from stipulatio. It may at this 
stage be worth stating expressly that a legal remedy on an agreement is 
needed not in accordance with the frequency of important transactions but 
in accordance with the frequency of their going wrong. 
The origins of the stipulatio7 are obscure, and may have involved a 
libation or an oath, but they need not concern us now,8 nor should further 
conclusions be drawn from any hypothesis as to origins. What matters is 
that it was well developed before the time of the Twelve Tables, under which 
the contract was actionable by the form of process known as legis actio per 
iudicis postulationem.9 It was a formal, and unilateral contract in which the 
promisee asked: 'Do you promise (whatever it might be)?' necessarily using 
the verb spondere, and the promisor immediately replied: 'Spondeo' ('I 
promise'), using the same verb. Later, other verbs could be used, but 
spondere could only be used by Roman citizens. The content of the promise 
was judged only by the words used, and the contract would remain valid and 
effective even if the promise was induced by fraud, extorted by fear or 
proceeded on an error. Stipulatio could be used for any lawful purpose: to 
promise a dowry, make a sale (when mutual stipulationes would be needed), 
engage one's services,10 and so on. But when an agreement was not cast in 
the form of a stipulation then, no matter how serious the intention of the 
parties, no matter how important the subject matter of the transaction, 
there was no contractual obligation and no right to any disappointed party 
to bring a contractual action. 
Stipulatio, by skillful modernization, could have become the root of a 
flexible, unitary contractual system. Writing, perhaps incorporated into two 
documents, could have been adopted as an alternative to the oral promise 
and answer, or agreement (however it was proved) could have become the 
basis of a contract; remedies for fraud, intimidation, or error could have 
been made inherent in the contract; and implied terms could have been 
developed for specific factual situations. Instead, a number of other 
individual contracts arose, each defined in terms of its function. This 
definition by function and not by form separates them sharply from 
stipulation. They might even appear to be lesser breeds, particular rather 
7. Also known as the sponsio. 
8. See e.g., Max Kaser, Das altromische lus (Gottingen, 1949) 256 ff.; H. van den Brink, 
Ius Fasque, Opmerkungen over de Dualiteit van het archdisch-romeins Recht (Amster- 
dam, 1968) 172ff; Okko Behrends, Der Zwolftafelprozess (Gottingen, 1974) 35-36; and the 
authors they cite. 
9. G. 4.17a. 
10. See, e.g., Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 168ff. 
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than general. Each of the contractual arrangements, however, whether it be 
loan for consumption or sale, could be cast in the form of one or more 
stipulationes, and then would be that latter type of contract. 
One early contract was mutuum, loan for consumption. Mutuum was 
provided with the action known as the condictio, which lay when the 
plaintiff's claim was that the defendant was the owner of a thing which he 
was under a legal duty to deliver to the plaintiff. Many scholars believe 
mutuum to be very old with a prehistory before it came to be provided with 
the condictio-and if so, the general argument of this paper is strengthened- 
but much that is peculiar about the condictio is explicable, as we shall see, if 
we link the introduction of that action with the creation of mutuum as a 
legal institution. The legis actio per condictionem was introduced by the lex 
Silia when what was claimed was a determinate sum of money, the lex 
Calpurnia when what was claimed was a definite thing." It is usually held 
that the lex Silia was earlier on the basis that otherwise there would be no 
need for a law specifically covering money.'2 David Daube, as we shall see, 
adds a new dimension. In any event, whatever the priority of these two 
statutes may have been, the remedy of the condictio is old. As early as the 
composition of the Rudens by Plautus, who died in 184 B.C., the classical 
procedure by formula could be used for the condictio as well as the archaic 
procedure by legis actio. 3 And there would be little point in setting up fresh 
legis actiones onceformulae were in being. 
The peculiarities of the condictio are that it is abstract in the sense that the 
plaintiff does not set out in the pleadings the grounds of his case; it is general 
in that it can be brought any time a nonowner believes that the owner of 
money or a certain thing is under a legal obligation to give it to him;14 and 
that, apart from exceptional cases, there had to be a preceding delivery of 
the thing to the defendant by the plaintiff. Thus, the condictio could be 
brought both where there was and where there was not a contract.15 The 
generality coupled with the abstraction requires explanation, and the 
simplest explanation is that the condictio was originally envisaged for one 
concrete situation-and was found to be extendable to others which was 
so obvious that it did not have to be expressly set out. The most obvious 
concrete situation is mutuum, which in fact has always been treated as the 
primary use of the condictio. Loan for consumption would need to be given 
legal effectiveness when there was a breakdown in neighborly relations, 
when one friend failed to repay a loan: in an early agricultural community a 
loan of seed corn to be repaid after the harvest would be a common case. No 
stipulation would have been taken precisely because it is morally inappro- 
11. G. 4.19. 
12. See e.g., Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 170-71. 
13. See for the argument, Alan Watson, Roman Private Law around 200 B. C. (Edinburgh, 
1971) 126-27. 
14. The condictiofurtiva which is exceptional need not concern us here. 
15. See e.g., Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 492-93. 
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priate for one friend, performing an amicable service, to demand a formal 
contract from another.'6 Where the loan was commercial, a stipulation 
would have been taken, to cover interest as well, and there would be no need 
for a specific contract of mutuum. We now see also why the action on 
mutuum was for the principal only and did not extend to interest: friends do 
not demand interest from friends.'7 The breakdown in neighborly relations 
might be related to an increase in Rome's size. 
But the earliest action for a mutuum was apparently for money, not for 
seed corn. This is explained by David Daube in a wide framework.'8 He 
stresses that 'some transactions, originally belonging to the gift area of 
fellowship, "Gemeinschaft," tend to assume the more rigid, legalistic 
characteristics of partnership, "Gesellschaft," when money enters.' Specifi- 
cally with regard to mutuum, the giving of an action-at first restricted to a 
money loan-marks for him a breakdown in the gift trade.19 Earlier, a gift 
of corn or money to a friend in need was expected to be returned by a 
converse gift at an opportune time. I would prefer to think that even before 
the lex Silia, the idea of mutuum was that of a loan to be returned in due 
course, but that is a minor matter. What is significant is that Daube offers a 
plausible explanation for the condictio being originally restricted to a claim 
for money. 
Deposit was, I believe, another early specific type of contract. The jurist 
Paul tells us: 'On account of deposit an action is given by the Twelve Tables 
for double, by the praetor's edict for single.'20 It has long been held that the 
action for double under the Twelve Tables, being penal, was not necessarily 
based on any concept of contract and was closer to delict.21 A further 
16. In French law any noncommercial (in the technical sense) transaction above a very small 
amount can be proved only by a notarial act or a private signed writing except, under art. 
1348 of the Code civil, when it is not possible for the creditor to procure writing. 
'Possible' here refers to moral possibility as well as physical, and in certain close 
relationships, such as those involving one's mother, mistress or physician, the obtaining 
of a writing is regarded as morally impossible. 
17. Some scholars, for instance Kaser, lus, supra note 8, 286, suggest that a real action, the 
legis actio sacramento in rem, was available for mutuum before the introduction of the 
condictio. There is no evidence for this, and the availability of such an action would 
make it more difficult to explain the introduction of the condictio. But the suggestion 
would not adversely affect the idea expressed here that mutuum was given specific 
protection because the arrangement was among friends and stipulatio was morally 
inappropriate. At whatever date, a commercial loan would involve interest, a stipulatio 
would be taken, and there would be no need for specific legal protection of mutuum. 
18. David Daube, 'Money and Justiciability,' Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung (rom. Abt.) 
(1979) Iff. 
19. Ibid. 11. See earlier David Daube, 'The Self-Understood in Legal History,' Judicial 
Review 18 (1973) 120, 129-30. 
20. Collatio 10.7.11. The action has often been thought to be something other than an 
action for deposit or to be an action for what was later called depositum miserabile but 
see now, e.g., Watson, Roman Private Law, supra note 13, 151; Kaser, Privatrecht 
I, supra note 4, 160 n.49. 
21. See, e.g., Watson, Roman Private Law, supra note 13, 157; Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra 
note 4, 160. 
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suggestion is sometimes made that the delict is akin to theft.22 But what must 
be stressed at this point is the very restricted scope of the action. It lies, if we 
believe Paul, where a thing that was deposited is not returned: it does not lie, 
according to Paul's words, and no similar ancient action we know of lies, if a 
thing that was hired out or lent for use is not returned or even if a fee were to 
be paid for looking after the deposited property. Moreover, apart from 
questions of contract, there seems little need for the action. The owner 
would have the normal action (of the time) claiming ownership, the legis 
actio sacramento in rem, and he would have the action for theft if the 
depositee moved the thing (and it would be of little use to him if he did not). 
There seems little reason to single out this particular situation for a specific 
action based on the notion of delict. 
What then would impel the desire for a specific action? Deposit differs 
from hire of a thing and loan for use first in that the object deposited is being 
taken out of circulation-no one can use it, certainly not the depositee, for 
the contract is definitely not for the benefit of the depositee. Secondly, in 
deposit it is precisely the recipient who is bestowing the favor. It follows that 
the depositor is in no position to demand that the recipient formally promise 
by contract to restore the thing-the depositor cannot reward the depositee 
for his good deed by showing doubts about his honesty. Again, the reason 
the depositor is willing to have his property out of circulation for a time is 
often that he finds himself in an emergency and cannot look after the 
property himself-as a result of earthquake, fire, collapse of a building or 
shipwreck-and here too, he is in no position to demand the formality of a 
stipulation from his helper. But the depositor is particularly vulnerable to 
fraud, and it is reasonable to give him a forceful remedy with penal 
damages. In the late Republic, the praetor issued a complicated edict on 
deposit23 of which the main clauses gave an action for double damages 
against a depositee who fails to return property entrusted to him in what is 
called depositum miserabile-deposit made as a result of earthquake, fire, 
collapse of a building or shipwreck-and an action for simple damages in 
other cases. Arguments have been produced both for the proposition that 
the Twelve Tables' provision applied only to depositum miserabile24 and 
also for the proposition that it applied to deposits of all kinds. The 
arguments seem inconclusive, though I tend to favor the second and more 
usual view, but in either eventuality the argument given here for an early 
specific action in fraud would fit. The strength of feeling that the depositor 
should have an action in the event of fraud would be intensified if, as seems 
likely, deposits were frequently made in temples or with priests.25 
22. E.g., ibid. 160. 
23. See, e.g., Otto Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3d ed. (Leipzig, 1927) 288-89. 
24. The literature is enormous, but see, e.g., W. Litewski, 'Studien zum sogenannten 
"depositum necessarium," ' Studia et Documenta Historiae et luris 43 (1977) 188ff, 
especially at 194ff., and the works he cites. 
25. Cf., e.g., Plautus, Bacchides, 306. 
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One of the great Roman inventions-it is now widely accepted that there 
were no foreign models26 is the consensual contract, a contract that is 
legally binding simply because of the parties' agreement and that requires no 
formalities for its creation. There were four of these, and it is generally 
presumed that the contract of sale, emptio venditio, was the earliest. It seems 
to me to have been fully actionable by around 200 B.C.27 There have been 
numerous theories to explain the origins of consensual sale.28 Some of these, 
such as the hypothesis that at one time the agreement became binding only if 
the buyer had given the seller an earnest of his payment of the price or only if 
the seller had delivered to the buyer, are now seen to lack support from the 
sources. Other theories attempt to explain how Romans got the idea that 
agreements without formality might be actionable. For instance, Theodor 
Mommsen's work on state contracts, involving the public sale of booty, is an 
example.29 Mommsen's theory provides no insight, however, into the 
transformation of private bargains into contracts of sale which, though 
made by private individuals, were enforced by the courts. There may be 
more than one root in the development of the consensual contract. But 
whatever economic or social pressures one wants to postulate, whether one 
says consensual sale was wanted because (as some think) of an expansion of 
foreign trade and contracts were wanted which could be made at a distance, 
or because (as others hold) a formless contract was needed since foreign 
merchants were unfamiliar with Roman law formalities, or because (as still 
others argue) a growing awareness of the value of good faith in contract law 
arose in the context of dealings between Romans and foreigners,30 the same 
conclusion holds: consensual sale as a separate contract arose in part 
because of the inadequacy of the stipulatio for the task. There should be no 
doubt that before the introduction of the consensual contract, parties to a 
sale-type transaction who wanted legal enforcement of their agreement 
would make their arrangements in the form of stipulations.31 And further 
26. See, e.g., Di6sdi, Contract, supra note 4, 44-45. 
27. See Alan Watson, Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1965) 
40ff. 
28. See, e.g., Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 546; Herbert F. Jolowicz and Barry 
Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3d ed. (Cambridge, 
1972) 288ff., and the works they cite. 
29. Theodor Mommsen, 'Die r6mischen Anfange von Kauf and Miethe,' Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung 6 (rom. Abt.) (1885) 260ff. 
30. Scholars who take any one of these approaches also wish to give a central role in the 
invention to the peregrine praetor. This seems to me to be unnecessary, but the point 
need not detain us here: see Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic 
(Oxford, 1974) 63ff. 
31. This appears even in Mommsen, 'Anfange,' supra note 29, 260; see also, e.g., Ernst 
Immanuel Bekker, Die Aktionen des romischen Privatrechts I (Berlin, 1871) 156ff.; 
Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, La Compravendita in diritto romano I, 2d ed. (Naples, 1956) 
57ff. Dio6sdi objects, asking why it would be necessary to cut up 'the uniform contract of 
spot transactions into two separate contracts, to confirm the two promises with a 
stipulatio, then abandon the stipulationes shortly so that at the beginning of the 
preclassical age the contract appears as already in its classical shape.' Di6sdi, Contract, 
supra note 4, 45. By spot transaction, he appears to have mancipatio in mind. There are 
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development would not have occurred if this way of making the arrangement 
had been satisfactory. 
My own version of the origins of consensual sale and the connection with 
stipulatio32 derives from the observation of two defects in the contract of sale 
that continued to exist for centuries, namely that the contract did not 
contain any inherent warranty of title or against eviction nor any inherent 
warranty against latent defects. Yet buyers did want the protection of 
warranties, as hundreds of texts on the actual taking of warranties by 
stipulatio show. And the notion of inherent warranties was not foreign to 
Roman lawyers since they had already existed for centuries in the 
mancipatio, the formal method of transferring certain types of important 
property. The absence of inherent warranties would make the consensual 
contract far less valuable commercially. Whenever merchants wanted 
warranties-and the evidence shows that they often did-then the parties 
had to be face-to-face to take a stipulation; hence, the contract could not be 
made by letter or messenger. Certainly, one could send a dependent member 
of one's family to take or give the stipulation, but that in itself would often 
be inconvenient and expensive.33 The absence of inherent warranties for 
centuries, the strong Roman desire for warranties, and their knowledge that 
warranties could be implied, demand an explanation which I believe can be 
found only if we postulate an origin for the contract where the deficiencies 
were not so obvious.34 
If we go back beyond the origin of sale, the parties to a sale-like 
arrangement who wished a legally binding agreement would, as I have said, 
conclude their business by stipulations. All terms, given the nature of 
stipulatio, would have to be spelled out. The buyer would promise payment 
on a fixed date, with interest if he delayed. The seller would promise that he 
would deliver the thing on a fixed day, to pay a penalty if he delayed, that 
the buyer would not be evicted from the thing, and that the thing was free 
two flaws in this argument. First, the object of the sale-type transaction would not always 
be a res mancipi, in which case mancipatio would be inappropriate, Secondly, even in the 
earliest times, even when the object was a res mancipi, the parties would not always want 
a spot transaction, but delivery at a later time, and mancipatio would not then be used. 
32. Alan Watson, 'The Origins of Consensual Sale: a Hypothesis,' Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 32 (1964) 245ff. 
33. In fact, the stipulatio could not be taken from a son or slave with full protection until the 
introduction of the actio quod iussu. That action appears to be based on an edict of the 
praetor (Lenel, Edictum, supra note 23, 278) and actions based on an edictal clause 
which gives the plaintiff a new right of action cannot be safely dated back beyond around 
100 B.C.; see Watson, Law Making, supra note 30, 38. 
34. Nicholas does not agree, and suggests for the persistence of the stipulations that they 
imposed strict liability whereas liability on sale would be based only on good faith: 
Jolowicz and Nicholas, Introduction, supra note 28, 289 n.8 (at p. 290). This does not 
address the problem, which is not the continued use of stipulatio but the absence of 
implied warranties in sale. Those who wanted strict liability could still have demanded a 
stipulatio even if emptio venditio had implied warranties. Again, this approach does not 
lessen the commercial inconvenience of the lack of implied warranties. Moreover, it must 
be surprising in a contract of sale which is based on good faith that there is no warranty 
of title or of quiet possession. 
9 
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from hidden defects. Each stipulatio was unilateral, but the parties would 
want their rights and duties to be reciprocal, hence the obligation to fulfill 
each stipulatio would have to be made conditional upon the fulfillment of, 
or the readiness to fulfill, the other. To make matters worse, this conditional 
reciprocity would have to be framed so as to take account of a partial, but 
not complete, failure to perform. For instance, if a purchased slave were 
found to be suffering from some relatively unimportant defect, the buyer 
might still wish to retain the slave but pay a reduced price. The drafting and 
taking of the stipulations would be extremely cumbrous and complex, and 
often it would happen that the parties'intentions would be frustrated. So far 
we are on sure ground. What follows is a conjectural, but I think plausible, 
account of how the praetor, the magistrate in charge of the law courts, would 
deal with the problem. At some point in time a praetor accepted that he 
ought to grant an action in accordance with good faith to cover accidental 
interstices in stipulations concerned with a sale.35 Above all he would seek to 
make the obligations reciprocal. In accordance with the Roman tendency to 
see law in terms of blocks,36 the strict law stipulatio and the new action 
based on good faith would be kept separate. But the position would be 
reached that provided there was a sale-type situation and at least one 
stipulatio, there would be an action to give the buyer or the seller an action 
against the other for an amount equal to what ought to be given or done in 
accordance with good faith. The separate contract of sale was in process of 
being born. But what would be the content of the necessary stipulation? In 
the simplest possible sale-type transaction there would be an immediate 
handing over of the money and the thing. The stipulation entered would 
cover only continuing obligations. It would be made only by the seller and 
would consist of a warranty against eviction and against latent defects. We 
know from the republican writer Varro that these warranties were contained 
in a single stipulation.37 Eventually, an action on emptio venditio would be 
given even when no stipulation was taken, but because of the way the 
contract emerged, it long provided no remedy if the buyer suffered eviction 
or the object contained hidden defects, provided that the seller had acted in 
good faith. Heavy stress is placed on good faith in emptio venditio whether 
this was the result of the way the contract emerged or, as many think, was 
part of the pressure for recognizing the contract. This suggested develop- 
ment has one further feature that renders it plausible. It avoids any sudden 
leap forward in legal thinking: it is bedded firmly on how parties to a 
sale-type transaction would conduct their business, and the gradual response 
of those in charge of law-making to the problems that arose.38 
35. Strict textual proof is lacking, but a development from the strict law stipulatio to good 
faith emptio venditio can have been no other. 
36. For this, see, Alan Watson, The Making of the Civil Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 14ff. 
37. de re rustica, 2.2.4; 2.3.4; 2.4.5. 
38. The impact of the defects in early consensual sale would be less noticeable, of course, 
where what was sold was a res mancipi and it actually was delivered by mancipatio, 
which did have an inherent warranty against eviction. Even here, however, there was no 
warranty against latent defects. 
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A second consensual contract, hire, locatio conductio, has more obscure 
origins. The usual assumption is that its beginnings are closely connected 
with those of sale and that sale was the more important case: either the 
example of sale was followed for hire, which is thus a later contract, or the 
impetus for recognizing a contract of sale impelled also, and simultaneously, 
the recognition of the less significant locatio conductio. The need to attach 
legal importance to good faith in contracts would, for instance, be one joint 
impelling factor.39 If one grants priority to sale, whether in time or in legal 
importance, then one fact emerges unequivocally in the case of hire, though 
strangely it appears never to have been noticed. Locatio conductio is a 
residual category for all types of bilateral agreement that are not sale and 
where the prestation of one of the parties has to be in money. This and this 
alone can account for the peculiarity that at least three very different 
contractual situations are included within it: the use of a thing for a time in 
return for money; providing one's labor for a time in return for money; the 
assignment of a specific task to be performed in return for money. In each of 
these situations the obligations of the party who is acting in return for 
money are very different. Any doubts that locatio conductio is a residual 
category must disappear when one notices that in the corresponding 
situations where no money is to change hands then the one contract is 
replaced by three: mandate, deposit, and loan for use.40 It is in the highest 
degree illuminating for the force of legal tradition in legal development that 
such a figure as locatio conductio came into being, remained unchanged in 
its scope throughout the Roman period, and still flourishes in some 
countries, such as France, Chile, and Argentina, as a contract today. 
As a further indication that one need not, even within the Western 
tradition, draw the line between one type of contract and another exactly as 
it usually is drawn, it is worth observing that in the second century B.C. at 
Rome, an agreement to allow another to pasture his flock on one's land for 
the winter in return for a money payment was regarded as sale of the 
fodder.41 Classical Roman and modern law would treat the agreement as 
hire. The republican position was perfectly sensible and would have 
remained so in classical law, given the fact that sale did not involve a 
requirement to transfer ownership, but only to give quiet possession-in this 
39. For views see, e.g., Jolowicz and Nicholas, Introduction, supra note 28, 294ff. 
Significantly, one recent writer on ancient hire, H. Kaufman, offers no view on the 
origins of the consensual contract: H. Kaufman, Die altr6mische Miete (Cologne, 1964). 
40. Actually, locatio conductio is so obviously a residual category-every bilateral 
transaction involving a money prestation that is not sale is hire-that one need not start 
with the assumption of the priority of sale. From the very fact of the residual nature of 
hire one can deduce the priority of sale. Unless, that is, one were to argue (as I think no 
one would), that originally sale transactions were within the sphere of locatio conductio 
and that emptio venditio was carved out of the all-embracing contract. 
Perhaps it should be expressly stated that the three gratuitous contracts just mentioned 
do not correspond to the three major types of locatio. 
41. Cato, de agri cultura 149. 
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case for the duration of the agreement. The standard warranties in sale 
against eviction and hidden defects would have been perfectly appropriate. 
A third consensual contract, mandatum, mandate, was in existence by 
123 B.C.,42 but its raison d'etre was different from emptio venditio and 
locatio conductio. Mandate is the agreement to perform a service gratuitously 
for another. It is not a commercial contract, but an agreement among 
friends and is thus again the type of situation in which a stipulation could 
not be demanded-neither from the friend who was asked to perform the 
service nor by the friend for repayment of his expenses. That the contract 
came into existence at all is a tribute to the great weight that the Romans 
placed upon friendship-friends were expected to do a great deal for one 
another. It may seem surprising that such a distinction is made between 
agreeing to act gratuitously for another and acting for reward, but the 
Roman attitude that labor degrades sufficiently explains it. This also 
explains why performance of artes liberales could not be the subject of 
locatio conductio.43 
A similar explanation can account for the emergence of commodatum, a 
gratuitous loan for use, as a separate contract, probably around the 
beginning of the first century B.C.:44 one friend who lends gratuitously to a 
friend cannot demand a formal promise in return. The same holds for the 
remodelled obligation of deposit that probably arose around the same date. 
The origins of pignus, pledge, as an individual contract are not so easily 
uncovered. As a real security transaction giving the creditor the right to a 
specific action pursuing the thing pledged wherever it might be, pignus 
appears to be relatively old, but this does not imply that pignus also gave rise 
to a contractual action. There is no evidence that there ever existed a 
contractual action at Roman civil law,45 but the praetor certainly gave one 
by his Edict no later than the first century B.C.46 At the very least, the 
praetorian action is much more prominent than any presumed civil law 
action, and its wording is revealing: 'If it appears that Aulus Agerius (the 
plaintiff) delivered to Numerius Negidius (the defendant) the thing which is 
the object of this action, as a pledge because of money that was owing; and 
that money has been paid, or satisfaction made on that account, or it was 
due to Numerius Negidius that payment was not made, and that thing has 
not been returned to Aulus Agerius, whatever the matter in issue will come 
to .. .' and so on. There existed also the so-called iudicium contrarium 
42. Rhetorica ad Herennium, 2.13.19: see, e.g., Alan Watson, Contract of Mandate in 
Roman Law (Oxford, 1961) 22. 
43. See, e.g., Karoly Visky, Geistige Arbeit und die Artes Liberales in den Quellen des 
romischen Rechts (Budapest, 1977) 146ff. 
44. For the dating, see Watson, Law Making, supra note 30, 31ff, especially 38. 
45. See, e.g., Lenel, Edictum, supra note 23, 254ff., who, however, thinks there was such an 
action; and Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 537, who apparently tends to think there 
was not. 
46. See Watson, Obligations, supra note 27, 182ff. 
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which was available to the creditor,47 but there is no doubt that the primary, 
and perhaps at one stage the sole, contractual action lay to the debtor 
against the creditor. The main thrust of introducing the contract was thus 
the protection of the debtor. The real security of pignus could be made 
without delivery, but, as the wording of the action indicates, there was a 
contract only if the pledge had been delivered to the creditor, and the 
contract gave rise to an action only when the debtor had repaid the loan or 
made satisfaction. Thus, in at least the great majority of cases, there could 
have been no physical obstacle to a stipulation. Even if delivery were not by 
the debtor personally but by someone in the power of the debtor, such as a 
son or slave, to the creditor, or delivery were made to someone in the 
creditor's power, a stipulation could have been taken which would be legally 
binding. The actio quod iussu which would (for our purposes) make a head 
of household liable for a stipulatio made on account of his transaction by 
one of his dependents is unlikely to be much later than contractual pignus.48 
And since the transaction is commercial, moral obstacles to a stipulation of 
the kind already mentioned would not have existed. 
Tentatively, I would suggest a possible reason for this introduction within 
the tradition of Roman contract law. It rests on the premise that in the 
normal case, from an inside point of view, however unscrupulous or 
disreputable a lender might be, it is the lender who is doing the borrower a 
favor. The emphasis is on the fact that the borrower needs the cash, the 
lender has it, and is willing to lend. The borrower will not always be able to 
insist easily on taking a stipulation from the lender for the return of the thing 
after payment. The very request for the formal promise to do one's obvious 
moral duty implies distrust. It might be objected that an honest lender would 
have no qualms about giving a stipulation; but the legal action is not needed 
for transactions that go well but for those that go wrong, and it is obviously 
aimed primarily at the dishonest creditor.49 
But suppose one did not find an approach of this kind to be plausible, but 
insisted instead that an explanation had to be sought in economic or social 
needs for the emergence of the contract of pignus? That explanation would 
47. See, e.g., D.13.7.9 pr; 13.6.16.1 
48. Though the actio quod iussu is not evidenced for the Republic. See Watson, Obligations, 
supra note 27, 187-88. 
49. A further reason for the introduction of the new contractual action was that it could 
allow more of a role for reliance on good faith even though the praetorian action did not 
have a condemnation clause framed exfide bona. In favor of this explanation is the fact 
that fiducia-the older form of real security (and not contractual in terms of the 
definition given at the beginning of this paper)-was erected by using mancipatio with a 
special clause relating to trust and faith: see Watson, Obligations, supra note 27, 172ff. 
Indeed, it is possible that the existence offiducia was influential by way of analogy for 
the creation of pignus. Fiducia had two limitations: its dependence on mancipatio meant 
that only res mancipi could be so pledged (unless the cumbrous in iure cessio were used) 
and that only citizens (or those with commercium) could be creditors or debtors. The 
praetor might thus have introduced the very different contract of pignus, also because of 
the difficulties involved in framing stipulation that would adequately cover the debtor's 
rights. 
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not be found. It is difficult to envisage much economic or social pressure for 
the new contractual action even when no stipulation was taken. If a repaid 
creditor failed or refused to return the thing pledged, the former debtor 
would have the ordinary action available to an owner claiming his property, 
which by this date would be the vindicatio. Where the creditor's behavior 
was theftuous, the debtor would have in addition the action on theft, the 
actiofurti, for a penalty. Even if one assumes that from the beginning, as 
certainly later, the formula was also intended to give the action where the 
creditor returned the pledge in a damaged condition-and given the 
wording, the assumption seems implausible-then the debtor already had a 
right of action under the lex Aquilia where it was the creditor or someone in 
his power who did the damage negligently or maliciously. The one situation 
previously unprovided for but now covered by the contractual action (and 
within straightforward interpretation of the wording) is where the creditor 
failed to return the pledge because it had been stolen from him in a case in 
which he had been negligent. For much the same reasons, there can have 
been little economic need for the contract of commodatum, or as we have 
seen, of depositum. To a great extent we must look for an explanation in the 
context of the legal system. 
It would not be surprising-though there is no positive evidence-to 
discover that the praetorian actions on deposit, loan for use, and pledge 
were historically linked. The action of the Twelve Tables on deposit was the 
result of moral outrage and, much later, the Edict limited the remedy in 
most cases to simple restitution. Loan for use was seen not to be dissimilar; 
hence likewise a contractual action was given where property in the hands of 
one person as a result of agreement was not duly returned to the owner; and 
pignus (which may or may not be older than commodatum) was seen as 
another example. 
We have no real indications of how or when or to what end the literal 
contract arose, and hence no argument can be drawn from it for or against 
any theory of the growth of Roman contract law. It was in existence by 
around the beginning of the first century B.C.50 but may well be much older. 
In classical law it arose when a Roman head of family marked in his account 
books that a debt had been paid when it had not, then made an entry to the 
effect that a loan had been made when it had not.l5 Thus it was not an 
originating contract but a method of transforming one kind of obligation 
into another. Whether that was also the case when the literal contract first 
came into being, and whether in the beginning the writing had to be in the 
formal account books is not clear.52 The action was the actio certae 
pecuniae, and therefore had to be for a fixed amount of money. The literal 
contract was flourishing in 70 A.D. when the eruption of Vesuvius 
destroyed Pompeii, but it had apparently disappeared from use by the end 
of the classical period. 
50. Cicero, de officiis, 3.58. 
51. See, e.g., Thomas, Textbook, supra note 5, 267ff. 
52. See, e.g., Watson, Obligations, supra note 27, 21ff. 
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Only one standard Roman contract, societas, partnership, remains to be 
examined, and its origins and growth are unique. The oldest Roman 
partnership, ercto non cito, is very old and came into being when the head of 
a family died and his estate went to his sui heredes,53 that is, persons who 
were subject to his paternal power and on his death came to be free of any 
power. They were immediately partners in the inheritance and remained so 
until the inheritance was divided. Since persons in the power of another 
owned no property, the sui heredes had nothing until the inheritance came 
their way, hence ercto non cito is a partnership of all the property of the 
partners. This is not a contractual partnership, but later persons who wished 
to set up such a partnership were allowed to do so by means of legis actio, 
the archaic form of process, before the praetor.54 Eventually the praetor 
gave an action on a consensual contract of partnership, perhaps around the 
time when he created the consensual contracts of sale and hire. But this 
consensual contract of partnership was modelled on the old ercto non cito: 
significantly, the praetor set out inl his Edict only oneformula, a model form 
of action, and that was for a partnership of all of the assets of the partners. 
Hence, the primary type of consensual partnership was not a commercial 
arrangement between merchants-they would want a much more restricted 
partnership-but between close relatives and friends, probably wishing to 
engage in a communal agricultural enterprise.55 Rome had long been 
commercially active, and a business partnership would clearly have been 
economically useful, but because of legal history and legal tradition the 
primary instance of consensual partnership was not mercantile. Whether 
from the outset, as certainly was the case later, there could be partnerships of 
a restricted kind cannot be determined. 
This origin of partnership in succession and not in business accounts for a 
peculiarity in consensual partnership. An heir was liable for the debts of the 
deceased, even if they exceeded the assets. Co-heirs would be liable for debts 
in the same proportion as they inherited. Hence the jurist Quintus Mucius 
Scaevola (killed in 82 B.C.) claimed that it was contrary to the nature of 
partnership that it be so set up that one partner was to take a greater share of 
any eventual profit than he would take of any eventual loss.56 Mucius's view 
is expressly based on the nature of partnership as he sees it, not on fairness. 
Though Servius Sulpicius successfully argued that such a partnership, and 
even one where one partner was entitled to share in the profit but not in any 
loss, was valid because that could be a fair arrangement if his services were 
valuable, yet Sabinus and Ulpian held that such an arrangement was valid 
53. G. 3.154a. 
54. G. 3.154b. 
55. See above all Alan Watson, 'Consensual societas between Romans and the Introduction 
offormulae,' Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquite 9 (1962) 431ff. 
56. G. 3.149. 
15 
Law and History Review 
only if in fact it were fair.57 This is the only instance in classical Roman law 58 
where a voluntary contractual arrangement entered into without error, 
coercion, or fraud, was valid only if there was an equivalence of contribution 
and reward. It owes its existence entirely to the internal logic of the legal 
tradition, and not at all to economic, social, or political pressures. It is the 
same legal logic and the piecemeal development of Roman contracts and not 
societal forces that either prevented the necessity for equivalence from 
spreading to the other bilateral contracts or from being extinguished for 
partnership. 
The force of this internal legal logic is apparent in another failure to 
develop. The contracts of deposit, loan for use, and mandate grew up one by 
one, but once they were all in existence there was no reason for not 
subsuming deposit and loan for use under mandate, except that they were in 
fact thought of as separate institutions. It is no obstacle that deposit and 
commodatum required delivery of the thing for the creation of the contract. 
The practical effect of the law would be unchanged if these contracts were 
incorporated into mandate: so long as nothing had been done on a mandate 
either party was free to revoke or renounce unilaterally.59 There might even 
be doubt at times, as Pomponius discovered, whether a particular 
arrangement was mandate or deposit.60 
The force on legal development of the lawyers' ways of looking at 
problems is even clearer when we look at contracts that did not develop or 
developed partially or late. To begin with, it is prima facie astonishing that 
the Romans never developed a contract in writing that would take its place 
by the side of stipulatio as a second contract defined by form, not by 
function. Such a contract would obviously have been very useful, above all 
for situations where the stipulatio would have been the obvious contract 
except that the parties could not easily be present together: these situations 
would include sales where warranties against eviction or latent defects were 
wanted. Again, a contract whose validity depended on the existence of 
writing would usually be easy to prove. In fact, other contracts including 
stipulatio61 were often reduced to writing partly in order to provide proof62 
and partly to ensure that the terms were not forgotten. Nor can the Romans 
have been unaware of the possibility or the usefulness of written contracts: 
57. D.17.2.29pr., 1: see for the argument, Alan Watson, 'The Notion of Equivalence of 
Contractual Obligation and Classical Roman Partnership,' Law Quarterly Review 97 
(1981) 275ff. 
58. Laesio enormis is post-classical, whether it is to be attributed to Diocletian or Justinian: 
C.4.44.2; 4.44.8. 
59. G. 3.159; D. 17.1.12.16. That damages were doubled for breach in depositum miserabile 
is not a problem. That could still be subjected to special regulation. 
60. D.16.3.12, 13, 14. 
61. D.45.1.122; 45.1.126.2; 45.1.140pr. 
62. There is something illogical about accepting a written document as evidence of a 
stipulatio. It can show the intention of the parties, but scarcely that they went through 
the formalities. 
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they had been standard even in classical Athens.63 And the jurist Gaius in 
the second century A.D. was well aware of the existence of Greek written 
contracts and of the contrast between them and the Roman literal 
contract.64 The absence of such a contract demands an explanation, which 
cannot be either economic or social. The most plausible explanation, I 
suggest, is that originally stipulation was the only contract, at a time when 
writing was not widespread. The habit of looking at stipulatio as the 
contract was so ingrained that other contracts arose as exceptions to or 
derogations from it only when stipulatio was obviously inappropriate. The 
idea of creating a new type of contract defined by form, which could be used 
in all situations where stipulatio could be used and in other situations where 
it could not, just did not occur to the Roman lawyers. 
Likewise, it is equally astonishing that no contract of barter developed 
until the empire at the earliest. Until the introduction of coined money 
around 275 B.C.65 a barter-type situation must have been the most common 
type of commercial transaction. Even afterwards, barter would be a frequent 
transaction. Yet barter, permutatio, as a legal institution comes centuries 
later than the contract of sale, and it was never fully accepted into the 
Roman system of contracts.66 As a contract it was very unsatisfactory: its 
formation required delivery by one party, and an action for nonperformance 
lay only for the value of the delivered goods. Contrast this with the contract 
of sale that required only the agreement of the parties, and in which an 
action lay for a sum of money equal to what the defendant ought to give or 
do in accordance with good faith. Nor can one say that a contract of barter 
was not needed because the all-purpose stipulatio was sufficient since the 
contract required an oral question and answer, hence the contracting parties 
had to be face-to-face. For barter between merchants in different places, the 
only way to make an agreement for a barter situation was for one of them to 
send to the other, often at considerable expense and inconvenience, a 
dependent member of his family, such as a son or a slave to take delivery or 
engage in mutual stipulationes. To say that Roman merchants would not 
engage much in barter is to forget that the introduction of coined money 
into Rome is relatively late, and to say that the Roman merchants would not 
find the law relating to barter inconvenient is to render inexplicable the 
introduction of such a splendid contract as sale. 
It would appear that the individual Roman contracts emerged-certainly 
because of societal needs-at a pace and with characteristics dictated by 
legal reasoning. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than a dispute between 
the Sabinian and the Proculian schools of jurists as to whether the price in a 
63. See, e.g., Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, 1978) 233. 
64. G. 3.134. 
65. See, e.g., Michael H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge, 1976) 35ff. 
66. The state of development of barter before the time of Justinian is very obscure, much 
disputed, and need not be gone into here. For literature, see e.g., Thomas, Textbook, 
supra note 5, 312-13; and Kaser, Privatrecht I, supra note 4, 381. 
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contract of sale could consist of a thing other than coined money.67 The 
Sabinians claimed that a text of Homer established that barter is the oldest 
form of sale.68 The Proculians, who prevailed, claimed that the Sabinians 
had mistranslated and argued that on that basis one could not determine 
what was the thing sold and what was the thing bought. At the root of the 
dispute is the serious business of extending satisfactory legal rules to barter. 
But the Sabinians, who were conscious of economic realities, were bound by 
the rules of the legal game and could not come out and argue for more 
desirable rules for barter-the most they could do was argue that barter was 
sale. At no point, moreover, could they argue for legal change on social or 
economic grounds. The Proculians, who may or may not have been blind to 
the economic realities, also produced arguments of a purely legal nature for 
their successful position.69 Law was being treated as if it were an end in itself. 
This indicates the existence of legal blindness. Apart from instances where it 
was morally impossible to demand a stipulation, the only derogations from 
stipulatio which were allowed to create a contract were those that involved 
an obligation to pay money: sale and the residual category of hire. It took 
even sale a very long time to break loose from the shackles of stipulatio. 
David Daube, as in the case of mutuum, feels that an explanation is 
needed for the failure to recognize a consensual contract of barter as early as 
sale. And he finds that this 'phenomenon is the result of the essentially 
intimate nature of moneyless barter as opposed to the distant aura in 
money-geared sale. Even at present, as a rule, an arrangement to swap 
records, cameras, houses (or partners) is more private and less law-oriented 
than one to transfer any of these possessions for money.'70 And he offers a 
similar explanation for the nonappearance of a contract that was akin to 
hire except in that neither of the prestations was in money.71 Now there is, I 
believe, undoubtedly much truth in the argument, but the problem of the 
nonappearance of these contracts is perhaps greater than Daube suggests. 
First, intimate contracts, not involving a money prestation, such as deposit 
and loan for use were recognized, provided that they were gratuitous. 
Second, barter between merchants would be much less intimate than the 
modern examples Daube suggests, especially in the days before coined 
money. For the absence of these transactions from the list of contracts one 
must add to the fact of no prestation in money the legal tradition that 
recognized only the stipulatio as a contract except when sufficient pressure 
arose in a very specific type of situation for the acceptance of a derogation 
from the stipulatio. Except when money was involved that pressure was 
67. G. 3.141; J.3.23.1; D.19.4.1 pr. 
68. For the argument see David Daube, 'Three Questions from Homer in D. 18.1.1.1,' 
Cambridge Law Journal 10 (1949) 213ff. 
69. A relatively satisfactory outcome, I believe, from the Sabinian viewpoint would be that 
barter is sale, and both parties have the obligation of sellers. 
70. Daube, 'Money,' supra note 18, 8. 
71. Ibid. 9. 
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greatest where the obligation was seen to be obviously friendly, involving 
trust, and hence gratuitous. 
Perhaps as early as the first century A.D., the Roman jurists began to 
devise remedies to plug gaps in the contractual system72-the remedy for 
barter seems to have been one of them. The jurist Paul in the second or third 
century A.D. eventually stated that an action would be given on any 
agreement of the following types provided the plaintiff had performed his 
side of the bargain: 'I give to you in order that you give, I give in order that 
you do, I do in order that you give, I do in order that you do.'73 Thereafter 
any agreement containing bilateral obligations which was followed by 
performance by one party gave rise to an action. It is sometimes said that 
this is a step towards a general theory of contract. This seems incorrect. 
Each individual type of contract remained, each with its own major quirks. 
There was still no general contract law. 
Finally, we should return to the oldest contract, stipulatio, which despite 
its long history never developed to its proper extent for reasons to be 
associated with the legal tradition. It is only to be expected that a very early 
contract is rigid, that the promisor is bound by what he says, and that the 
reason for his promise, even error, fraud or intimidation, is irrelevant. But 
once it came to be accepted, especially for the consensual contracts, that the 
obligations could be based on good faith, then only lawyerly conservatism 
and tradition would keep stipulatio a contract of strict law. There are 
societal advantages for the law taking good faith into account for contracts, 
and there is no social class of cheats. But no remedy was provided with 
regard to stipulatio for extortion or fraud until the first century B.C. 
Remedies (including action) for extortion were introduced by a praetor 
Octavius around 80 B.C. and for fraud by Aquillius Gallus apparently in 66 
B.C.74 What concerns us are the special defenses, exceptiones, of extortion 
or fraud, which could be raised when an action was brought on stipulatio. 
The point of an exceptio is precisely that the defendant is not denying the 
validity of the plantiff's case. He is merely claiming that there is another fact 
that ought to be taken into account. In other words, extortion or fraud did 
not invalidate a stipulatio. It remained valid, but its effect could be negated 
by the use of the defense. Stipulatio always remained at this primitive level. 
Nor should it be thought that the distinction between invalidity and blocking 
by an exceptio is insignificant: if the defendant failed to plead the exceptio 
expressly at the appropriate time, he could not plead it later and would lose 
his case. No explanation for retaining a stipulation as valid but rendering it 
ineffective is satisfactory other than that of lawyers' ideas of what is 
appropriate in law. 
The main thrust of this paper has been that it was Roman legal thinking, 
based on the tradition rooted in stipulatio as the original contract, that 
above all dictated the origins and nature of Roman contracts. Though 
72. See the texts collected in D.19.5. 
73. D.19.5.5.pr. 
74. For these see Watson, Obligations, supra note 27, 257. 
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societas does not develop as a derogation from stipulatio, the mature 
contract, in its origins and nature, too, and also in a unique and important 
rule, equally demonstrates the enormous role of the legal tradition for legal 
evolution. None of this, of course, excludes an input into the evolution of 
economic forces or of the politics of power. But this input of forces outside 
of the legal tradition did not have a commensurate outcome. Nothing 
illustrates this more clearly than the relatively early actionability of contracts 
of depositum, commodatum, and pignus on the one hand, and the late 
appearance and continuing unsatisfactory state ofpermutatio on the other. 
It is not just that the first three, individually and collectively, are of much 
lesser commercial importance than barter; it is also that they were scarcely 
needed in view of existing actions in property and delict, whereas attempts to 
engage with legal protection in barter at a distance were fraught with 
inconvenience and expense. And it is surely hard to believe that the Roman 
merchants and others who engaged in barter had less political 'clout' than 
the persons who deposited their property or lent it or used it as security for a 
loan or who engaged in the contract of sale. 
